

Treaty / What It Covers	Status	Canada's Role / What Needs to Happen	CNANW Role
<p>ABM – Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty 1972 signatories: bilateral agreement between USA and USSR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bans the testing , development and deployment of sea-, air-, space- and mobile land-based systems • Prohibits deployment of nationwide defence against strategic ballistic missile attack • Both parties agree to establish no more than one ABM site on their national territory (<i>sources: WILPF, Monterey Institute</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ABM is seen as the cornerstone of the current disarmament architecture • An ABM amendment was included in START II negotiations, to designate Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as successor states to the USSR. The Treaty still stands, but successor states have not yet been formally acknowledged by USA. • USA may be prepared to breach the ABM to develop NMD (<i>source: Monterey Institute</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work to preserve and strengthen ABM Treaty (NPT Step 7) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support efforts to preserve and strengthen ABM Treaty (NPT Step 7) • Oppose US NMD and Canada's involvement, as a breach of the ABM and other Treaties
<p>NPT – Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968 187 signatories including all NWS, but not Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan. The latter 3 are unwilling to give up their weapons capabilities to accede to the NPT.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Limits the nuclear parties to the treaty to China, France, Russia, UK, USA; sets guidelines for peaceful uses of nuclear energy; calls for nuclear states to begin total elimination of their arsenals (<i>source: Monterey Institute</i>) • It requires progress on nuclear disarmament in Article VI, promotes commercial nuclear technologies, permits “peaceful nuclear explosions” (<i>source: WILPF</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After several failed PrepComs, May 2000 NPT Review Conference agreed on 13 Practical Steps to facilitate implementation of Article VI. For the first time, the Review document includes strong commitments to nuclear disarmament by NWS. But wording is highly qualified and the NPT suffers from non-compliance among States Parties (i.e. Iraq, North Korea) (<i>source: Monterey Institute</i>) • Little has been done to implement the 13 Steps since 2000 NPT Review • Slow progress on CTBT could risk defections from NPT support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Canada played a key role in reaching May 2000 agreement, and is committed to progress</i> • Work must continue to bring non-signatories into NPT • Progress must be made on the 13 Steps, starting with 10 priority action points identified by Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) (attached) • Work is needed to strengthen the Review process, to achieve permanence with accountability (Westdal) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action on NPT is a major component of CNANW work plan • Take action on MPI's 10 priority points for implementing 13 steps • Conduct joint seminars with government • Expose contradiction between NATO NW policy and NPT obligations • With Canadian Institute for Foreign Policy Development, conduct Roundtable on NPT reporting mechanisms

CTBT - Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty

Negotiated in 1996, not yet in force
signatories: 160 including all NWS and Israel, but not India, Pakistan or DPRK; ratified by 75 as of late March, 2001

- Prohibits all “nuclear weapons test explosions and all other nuclear explosions”. It is intended to constrain “the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons” and end “the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons”
(source: *Monterey Institute*)
- The treaty can enter into force only when all 44 nuclear-capable countries sign and ratify.

- Of the 44 countries required to ratify, 31 have done so; India, Pakistan and DPRK have not.
- Russia has ratified, but links its compliance with US compliance to the ABM Treaty.
- China has not ratified. Supporting material has been submitted to People’s Congress, but Chinese ratification is not expected before US ratification.
- Against advice from many quarters, the US Senate voted against ratification in Oct. 1999; it is not likely to be re-considered until 2002
- Concerns have been raised about sub-critical and computer-based testing.
- CTBT is the focus of NPT Steps 1 and 2 on early EIF, and testing moratorium)

- *Canada led call for EIF meeting*
- Work to get the remaining 13 nuclear capable countries to sign and ratify CTBT, without conditions – starting with USA. Encourage bipartisan support and early ratification in the USA
- Work to ensure testing moratorium prior to EIF
- Work for UNGA resolution on test moratorium in 2001, and all later years, and for similar statements at EIF Conference.
- Work to have CTBT ratification addressed by Prep Coms for 2005 NPT Review
- Counteract arguments that CTBT is not verifiable: it is
- Encourage NWS to consider confidence-building and transparency measures at national test sites to facilitate verification

- Work on CTBT is one component of CNANW efforts on NPT Article VI implementation

<p>START I, II, III - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START I - 1991, 1992, EIF 1994 START II – negotiated 1993, EIF pending START III – talks initiated signatories: START I is a bilateral agreement between USA and USSR; START II negotiated between USA and Russia</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • START I sets a baseline for Russian and US arsenals of no more than 6,000 warheads on land- and sea-based missiles by Dec. 2001. • START II reduces the number to 3,000-3,500 strategic nuclear warheads each on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers effective 2007 • Discussions have begun between USA and Russia to further reduce nuclear arsenals to 2,000-2,500 each 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • START II with accompanying “extras” (negotiated in 1997) was ratified by the Russian Duma in early 2001. The original START II was ratified by USA in early 1996, but the Extension Protocol is now stuck at the doorstep of the US Congress. The USA must agree to the “extras” which include expanded accession for Entry into Force. • Russia has said it will withdraw from START I and II (and INF , see below) if USA proceeds with NMD and withdraws from ABM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued calls on Russia and USA to ratify and implement START II • Work for conclusion of START III 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work on START treaties is one component of CNANW efforts on NPT Article VI implementation
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<p>MTCR - Missile Technology Control Regime Formed: 1987 participating countries: 32</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An informal, voluntary association of countries which seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing proliferation of ballistic missiles and other unmanned air vehicle delivery systems, or related equipment, material or technology • Does not make export licensing decisions as a group. Individual partners are responsible for implementing the guidelines in accordance with national legislation and practice • Partners adhere to common export policy guidelines applied to a common list of controlled items. MTCR does not constitute a ban on these items, but provides a consultative mechanism for exchanging information on states making export requests (<i>source: Monterey Institute</i>) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Canada assumes chair of MTCR in September 2001 for 1 year, and will host annual plenary meeting of MTCR in Ottawa Sept. 24-28</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ottawa seminar on missile technology, following MTCR meeting
<p>FMCT or FISBAN – Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty Has not yet been negotiated; negotiations are stalled in the UN Conference on Disarmament deadlock</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Would ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 1993 the UNGA called for negotiation of a “non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in the most appropriate forum • The UN CD (below) became the forum, and negotiated a weak negotiating mandate in 1995 • G-21 (old non-aligned movement) reluctant to negotiate FMCT without 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Canada led on 1993 UNGA resolution calling for CD work program that includes FMCT, and played a large role in 1995 negotiations on CD mandate; led call at UNGA in 2000 for immediate FMCT negotiations</i> • Explore alternative ways to facilitate eventual negotiation of an FMCT • Press NWS to maintain production moratoria, discuss 	

	dealing more effectively with nuclear disarmament (Westdal)	voluntary transparency measures and accountability regime <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Encourage India and Pakistan to announce production moratoria and halt further production of weapon-useable fissile material• Hold technical and scientific seminars to discuss issues relating to scope, definitions, transparency, accountability, and verification	
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<p>OST - Outer Space Treaty 1967 63 signatories, including France, India, UK, USA, USSR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> prohibits nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from being placed in space, including in Earth orbit (<i>source: WILPF</i>) 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support current proposals to negotiate a Protocol to the OST, to prohibit the weaponization of space
<p>CD - United Nations Conference on Disarmament Established: 1978 (after the First UN Special Session on Disarmament) Negotiations currently deadlocked</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not a treaty, this UN body is the world's only multilateral arms control negotiating forum Nuclear weapons disarmament has always been the top priority on its agenda it was under the chapeau of "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" that the CTBT was negotiated Most non-NWS think the CD is an appropriate forum to discuss nuclear disarmament, but differ on its negotiating role. The NWS, except China believe that NW disarmament can not be negotiated in a multilateral forum 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The CD has been unable to agree on a program of work since 1996. Linkages of different issues, and blocks have led to deadlock. China insists on a CD negotiating mandate on preventing and arms race in space (PAROS) which USA agrees reluctantly to talk about but not negotiate. US will talk about PAROS and nuclear disarmament only if, at the same time, it is negotiating a fissile ban. FMCT and NPT "Practical Steps" fall under the CD's "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", but are stalled. France, Russia and USA are opposed to an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament that goes beyond an exchange of views 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Canada chaired CD in early 2001, and worked unsuccessfully to define a work program acceptable to all parties Look for alternative ways to begin work on key issues that CD may eventually address, via technical seminars etc Support an international conference on nuclear dangers, as proposed by UN Sec. Gen. Kofi Annan Work to establish CD subsidiary body to address nuclear disarmament, as part of the CD's program of work 	

Key: EIF = Entry Into Force ICBM = Inter-continental Ballistic Missile SLBM = ??? MIRV = ??? NW = Nuclear Weapons NWFZ= Nuclear Weapons Free Zone NWS = Nuclear Weapons States (China, France, Russia, USA, UK) UNGA = United Nations General Assembly

Principal Sources:

1. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom website: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/RCWOutreach/disarmtreatieslist.html>
2. Monterey Institute for International Studies, Centre for Non Proliferation Studies website: <http://www.cns.mii.edu.pubs/index>
3. Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Christopher Westdal: a) Notes for Remarks at the Middle Powers Initiative Strategy Consultations, New York, April 29-31, 2001 b) Evidence to Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, May 8, 2001